Apollo 13: The Success of Failure

Rollout
Rolling out the Apollo 13 rocket

Apollo 13 is perhaps one of the most well known of the Apollo missions, though it did not start out that way. Initially there was so little public interest in the mission that there were no live television interviews with the astronauts[1]. However, by the end of the mission, the entire world was paying attention. In fact, television coverage of the Apollo 13 splashdown surpasses any televised event in history up to that point including the first lunar walk of Apollo 11[1]. Despite the many complications and difficulties the mission faced, along with the fact that the astronauts never reached the moon, Apollo 13 was in many ways one of NASA’s greatest successes.

Apollo 13 launched from Kennedy Space Center on April 11, 1970 at 19:13:00 GMT (Greenwich Mean Time)[2]. The launch proceeded without any serious complications. After launch there were few noteworthy events until the accident that would effectively end the mission. At 55 hours 53 minutes ground elapsed time (GET), mission control temporarily lost all telemetry data for 1.8 seconds[2]. It was at this time that the warning system sounded and the crew heard a loud bang. Shortly after this, the crew reported that one of the cryogenic oxygen tanks was reading a pressure level of zero[6]. The oxygen tanks fed fuel cells which provided electrical power, generated oxygen for breathing, and produced water for the crew[6]. It soon became apparent that one of the oxygen tanks and three fuel cells, which powered the life support and other systems, had been lost[4]. The loss of this system was so severe that it quickly became evident that the new goal of the mission would no longer be to reach the moon, but instead simply to return the crew to earth alive[6].

After the accident the command module quickly began losing life support capabilities. In order the survive the rest of the mission, it was necessary for the crew to use the lunar module as a life boat of sorts[2]. The command module, which had been designed to be the major source of life support for the entire trip, only had 15 minutes of power left in its batteries while the crew was still three days from home. Without the fuel cells, the command module had no means of recharging its batteries, and the only source of power available were the batteries on the lunar module[3, 7]. At 58:40 GET the crew had powered up the lunar module, transferred the guidance system to the lunar module, and powered down the command module[2].

Having solved the first problem of providing immediate life support for the crew, the next issue that needed to be addressed was the crew’s trajectory. Earlier in the mission, the crew had performed a maneuver to lower the spacecraft’s approach to the moon[2]. Before this maneuver, the crew had been on a direct return to earth, but now the crew would miss earth entirely if they did not fire the retrorockets on the service module and jettison the lunar module[4]. Firing the retrorocket would be extremely dangerous without knowing the full extent of the damage, and releasing the lunar module was not an option as it was their only source of life support at the time. Another problem that the crew faced was that they were unable to determine their alignment due to the fact that the the lunar module was not meant to be used for calculating alignment and because debris still floating around the ship made it difficult to determine which stars were debri and which were real[6]. Without being able to determine their alignment, NASA could not determine the exact direction and burn time necessary to return them to a safe trajectory. The decision that was ultimately reached was to use the lunar module’s descent engine to put the crew back on a free return trajectory which would land them in the Indian ocean without any further corrections[4]. Another correction was planned for two hours after passing the moon. This second maneuver would get them back to earth faster and adjust their trajectory to land in the Pacific were the main recovery forces were stationed[2]. In order to solve the problem with alignment NASA figured out a way to determine alignment using the earth, moon, and sun through a telescope on the lunar module[6]. A procedure which had never been done or tested before. Both of the corrections were completed without incident and the crew only needed to make two small midcourse corrections to stay on the intended trajectory[4].

Having solved the crew’s immediate problems NASA now had to figure out how to stretch the crew’s resources to last the length of the mission. The most important consumables were water to cool the lunar and command module systems, drinking water, breathing oxygen, lithium hydroxide cartridges which were used to remove carbon dioxide from the air, and power stored in the lunar and service module batteries[2]. While it appeared all of these supplies were critically low immediately following the accident, the engineers at NASA managed to stretch them enough that by the time the crew landed there were several hours of each consumable left[2]. Oxygen for breathing and water for drinking were simply taken from the stores on the command module. Most of the rest of the consumables were saved by not using power in the lunar and command modules when not performing a maneuver, except those that were necessary; life support, communications, and telemetry[6]. This extended the crew’s recourses past what they needed including providing enough energy to recharge the command module’s batteries which were required for re-entry[6]. While the power down conserved necessary resources it came at a price. The temperature in the cabin was only 38oF and having no hot water to rehydrate the crew’s meals meant that all their food was also cold[6].

Having ensured that the rest of the consumables would last at least the length of the mission, the next step was to find a solution for the lithium hydroxide cartridges. These cartridges filtered carbon dioxide through them to remove it from the atmosphere and prevent the crew from suffocating. There were not enough cartridges in the lunar module to last the length of the mission and the modules from the command module did not fit the filter in the lunar module[6]. NASA eventually figured out a way to build an adapter for the cartridges using nothing but materials the crew had at hand. Mission control read the instructions up to the crew and the crew assembled the adapter out of cue cards, plastic bags, and tape[6].

The crew turned the systems in the lunar module on three hours ahead of schedule, in order to warm up before the arduous task of preparing for reentry[6]. Before the crew had to detach the lunar module. The crew climbed out of the lunar module and into the now fully powered command module. Since the command module had no thrusters to control push or pull, the crew simply fired pyrotechnics to detach the lunar module and let escaping pressure propel it away from the command module[6]. The crew watched as the lunar module, the lifeboat that had saved their lives, drifted off. Not designed for reentry, the module burned up in the atmosphere as it fell to earth, though some of the pieces survived and landed in open sea near Samoa and New Zealand[2].

The command module entered earth’s atmosphere 142 hours and 40 minutes into the mission with a velocity of 36,210.6 ft/s[2]. Mission control lost communication with the crew for roughly three minutes due to the incredible friction generated from re-entry, which interfered with their signal[6]. The command module had three large parachutes which slowed the crew down so they splashed down at safe speeds[6]. This system worked without any problem and on April 17 at 6:07:41 GMT the crew splashed down only about 3.5 nautical miles from the recovery ship, the USS Iwo Jima[2]. The crew was in good condition on board the USS Iwo Jima within 45 minutes of splashdown[4].

References

[1] J. Kauffman, “A successful failure: NASA’s crisis communications regarding Apollo 13,” Public Relat. Rev., vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 437–448, 2001.

[2] R. Orloff and D. Harland, “Apollo 13: The seventh manned mission: in-flight abort 11–17 April 1970,” in Apollo, Springer New York, 2006, pp. 361–392.

[3] “Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis,” NASA, 2014. [Online]. Available: https://history.nasa.gov/Apollomon/Apollo.html. [Accessed: 16-Feb-2017].

[4] S. A. Sjobe, “Mission Operations Report: Apollo 13,” Houston, Texas, 1970.

[5] “Apollo 13 seeks Age of the Moon,” Nature, vol. 226, p. 8,9, 1970.

[6] Office of Public Affairs, “Apollo 13 ‘Houston, we’ve got a problem.’”; Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

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  Timothy Durham was convicted of rape when a test showed his DNA genotype matched the DNA recovered from the crime scene. Eye witnesses testified that Durham was in a different state at the time of the incident, but he wasn’t exonerated from his 3000 year sentence until follow up DNA analysis showed that the preliminary forensic analysis used in the trial was misinterpreted (Thomas et al.). DNA testing serves an invaluable part in our criminal justice system, but it comes with complications and bias that can lead to wrongful convictions and misinformed juries.  

Background:

Forensic genetics aims to identify the origin of a biological sample. It can be traced back to Karl Landsteiner who discovered human ABO blood groups. With blood groups, suspects could be eliminated based on their blood type. For example, if a suspect had type A blood and there was type B blood left at the scene by the perpetrator, the investigators could rule out the suspect. Unfortunately, the reverse didn’t work. If the suspect and perpetrator both had the same blood type, it can’t be concluded that the suspect was guilty. Blood identifiers evolved into 8 distinct categories which improved the ability to eliminate suspects, but could only conclude that (if the system matched) it might be the perpetrator or this person might be related to the perpetrator (Jobling and Gill). The field evolved in the 1980s with the discovery of Minisatellites, lines of repetitive DNA that don’t encode proteins. Minisatellite patterns in DNA create what we know today as the DNA fingerprint, and it has a much higher accuracy rate than previous methods (Augustyn et al.). Around the same time, a breakthrough for victims of sexual assault was discovered. In the case of assault, bodily fluids of both the victim and the assaulter can get mixed. A process called differential lysis was created which could selectively increase the concentration of sperm in a fluid sample thereby allowing for accurate DNA testing (Jobling and Gill). Forensics evolved to use single-locus probe testing after several years because of its ease of interpretation. It looked at specific minisatellites that had high variability between subjects. This was the first DNA-based method to be used in a criminal investigation. Two murder homicides from several years apart were connected using DNA evidence. The evidence was then used to exonerate an innocent man, and the guilty party was found when he tried to evade mandatory DNA testing for all men in the small town. His guilt was then reinforced when the DNA profiles matched, and he gave a confession (Jobling and Gill). Finding DNA at a crime scene doesn’t guarantee that you’ll find a murderer. There are issues with non-pure samples and limited samples that make DNA work difficult, and accreditation of facilities and new techniques and take time (Jobling and Gill).  

Subjectivity of DNA Interpretation:

In a 2009 publication, the National Academy of Science discusses the possibility for subjective influence in lab based forensics. The interpretation bias happens in complex cases where, for example, there could be a mixture of DNA. A study published in 2011 looked specifically at this issue. A gang rape happened in Georgia, and the mixture in DNA from the case was used to prosecute one suspect after another suspect took a plea bargain to testify against him. With DNA mixtures, there are three possible conclusions: suspect excluded, suspect cannot be excluded, and inconclusive. If the suspect is excluded, it means that there’s little to no possibility that his DNA is part of the sample. If the suspect cannot be excluded, it means that there’s a possibility that his DNA is part of the sample. In the trial, the DNA examiners who knew the context of the case concluded that the suspect being prosecuted could not be excluded. The 2011 study gave the DNA evidence from this case and the DNA profiles of the suspects to 17 forensic examiners. These examiners had no context of the case, and they all worked independently. Of the 17, only 1 came to the same conclusion (suspect cannot be excluded) as the examiners who knew the context of the case. Twelve of the 17 concluded that the suspect who was prosecuted and convicted had no relation to the DNA found in the sample. Not only does this show that subjectivity occurs due to the context of the case, but the 17 examiners came up with different findings based on their past experiences meaning that not all DNA analysis is objective. Some organizations like the Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods say that quantitative statistical evidence should be presented with every categorical conclusion, but the US doesn’t require this (Dror and Hampikian).

False Positives:

There are two categories that cause wrongful identification in a DNA report: coincidental matches and false positives. Coincidental matches are DNA matches between two unrelated people. The probability of these matches is about 1 to 500,000 for white individuals and about 1 to 350,000 for black individuals. This small probability of coincidental matches makes people feel confident in DNA evidence. False positives, on the other hand, are matches between DNA and test DNA that result from issues in the forensics lab. There have been multiple cases of forensics labs accidentally switching victim and suspected rapist DNA which lead to convictions that were later overturned when the lab realized the error. There are also cases of misreading or misunderstanding a sample. In a case from 1993, a man was convicted of rape because someone interpreted a mixed sample of victim and perpetrator DNA as an individual sample. The conviction was again overturned. To prevent false convictions, retesting DNA is allowed, but it’s not an efficient solution. Many people are pushing for statistical information on the probability of false positives, so that the jurors can make accurate judgements based on DNA evidence (Thomas et al.).  

Conclusion:

DNA analysis is a useful tool for the criminal justice system, but subjectivity can be an issue in forensic testing. To combat wrongful convictions, there are organizations like The Innocence Project who use DNA testing to free the innocent, but reformed forensic testing standards should be put in place to prevent subjectivity and to ensure juries are correctly informed during trials. https://www.innocenceproject.org/    

Citation:

Augustyn , Adam, et al. “DNA Finerprinting.” Encyclopedia Britannica , 26 Apr. 2018, www.britannica.com/science/DNA-fingerprinting#ref153186. Dror, Itiel E., and Greg Hampikian. “Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture Interpretation.” Science & Justice, vol. 51, no. 4, 2011, pp. 204–208., doi:10.1016/j.scijus.2011.08.004. Jobling, Mark A., and Peter Gill. “Encoded Evidence: DNA in Forensic Analysis.” Nature Reviews: Genetics, vol. 5, no. 10, Oct. 2004, pp. 739–751., doi:10.1038/nrg1455. Thompson, William C, et al. “How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA Evidence.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, vol. 48, no. 1, Jan. 2003, pp. 1–8., doi:10.1520/jfs2001171.